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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this article is to examine whether, after 16 years or more of its 
development, R2P has emerged as an international norm of intervention. As an 
idea, it is clear that R2P has a considerable degree of prominence within 
international discourse. As will be shown in this article, there has been much 
work undertaken in the development of its language and conceptual framework 
over the years. However, whilst this architecture is important to the process of 
its development as an international norm, it will be argued that more is needed 
to support the claim that R2P has fully emerged as an international norm, i.e. 
R2P’s capacity to influence and shape the decision-making of states. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Since its conception, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), a concept of humanitarian protection 
(Pillar 1), prevention (Pillar 2) and intervention (Pillar 3), has been much heralded, much 
discussed and much criticised with what at best could be described as a mixed record of 
success. There has been a surfeit of claim, counter-claim, assertion and counter-assertion about 
both R2P’s ideational value and effectiveness. As a human rights policy or doctrine of human 
security, it has been strongly promoted as an international norm. R2P has been conceptualised 
and re-affirmed in a series of United Nations (UN) General Assembly resolutions beginning 
with the much heralded World Outcome Document of 2005. It has been discussed, supported 
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and criticised widely across the international community – from state capital to international 
organisation.1 However, in spite of the prominence with which R2P has been promoted and 
acclaimed, pertinent questions still remain about, if not its value as an idea, then certainly its 
position and its influence as an international norm in shaping the decision-making of states. 
This is particularly the case with the operation of its most controversial aspect and the focus of 
analysis in this article, its Pillar 3: this  encompasses the role and responsibility of the 
international community to react and use military intervention where the humanitarian situation 
demands such, due to a state’s perpetration of, or inability to prevent the perpetration of, mass 
atrocity crimes against its population (in particular genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity).2 R2P, therefore, could be viewed as acclaiming a norm of 
humanitarian intervention; however, this is not to confuse the conceptual parameters of R2P 
with the controversial doctrine of humanitarian intervention. A key distinction is that the 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention became synonymous with a claim to unilateral 
                                                            
1 See Alex J Bellamy, ‘The Responsibility to Protect: Added Value or Hot Air?’ (2013) 48(3) Cooperation & 
Conflict 334 (a leading scholar on R2P, noting that ‘[d]espite (or perhaps because) the rapid rise of RtoP… to a 
principle reaffirmed by the UN Security Council and utilised by the body in its response to crises in Sudan, Libya, 
Côte d’Ivoire, South Sudan and Yemen, RtoP has been subjected to criticism from a handful of states and a 
significantly larger number of scholars.’). See also Alex J Bellamy, Global Politics and the Responsibility to 
Protect: From Words to Deeds (Routledge, 2011); Alex J Bellamy, ‘Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? 
The Crisis in Darfur and Humanitarian Intervention after Iraq’ (2005) 19(2) Ethics & International Affairs 31; 
Alex J Bellamy, The Responsibility to Protect: Towards a ‘Living Reality’, Report written for the United Nations 
Association-UK (2013) 
www.una.org.uk/sites/default/files/The%20Responsibility%20to%20Protect%20Towards%20a%20Living%20
Reality%20-%20Professor%20Alex%20Bellamy.pdf (accessed 27 January 2016); Gareth Evans, ‘Responding to 
Mass Atrocity Crimes: The “Responsibility to Protect” After Libya’, Chatham House (6th October 2011) 
www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/178795 (transcript of speech). See generally, Aidan Hehir, 
Humanitarian Intervention: An Introduction (Palgrave MacMillan, 2013); Silva D Kantareva, ‘The Responsibility 
to Protect: Issues of Legal Formulation and Practical Application’ (2011–2012) 6(1) Interdisciplinary Journal of 
Human Rights Law 1; Justin Morris, ‘Libya and Syria: R2P and the Spectre of the Swinging Pendulum’ (2013) 
89(5) International Affairs 1265; John F Murphy, ‘Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Comes of Age? A Sceptics 
View’ (2012) 18(2) ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law 413; Ved P Nanda, ‘From Paralysis in 
Rwanda to Bold Moves in Libya: Emergence of the “Responsibility to Protect” Norm under International Law – 
Is the International Community Ready for It?’ (2011) 34(1) Houston Journal of International Law 1; Anne Peters, 
‘The Security Council’s Responsibility to Protect’ (2011) 8 International Organisations Law Review 15; Carsten 
Stahn, ‘Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?’ (2007) 101(1) American Journal 
of International Law 99; Ramesh Thakur, ‘R2P after Libya and Syria: Engaging Emerging Powers’ (Spring 2013) 
The Washington Quarterly 61; Rachel Van Landingham, ‘Politics or Law? The Dual Nature of the Responsibility 
to Protect’ (2012) 41(1) Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 63; Susan Breau, The Responsibility to 
Protect in International Law: An Emerging Paradigm Shift (Routledge, 2016); Andrew Garwood-Gowers, 
‘China’s “Responsible Protection” Concept: Reinterpreting the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and Military 
Intervention for Humanitarian Purposes’ (2016) 6 Asian Journal of International Law 89.  
2 Throughout the remainder of this article the term ‘R2P’ is used to refer solely to the Pillar 3 intervention aspect 
of the doctrine, unless otherwise indicated. 
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intervention by states, 3 whereas the operation of intervention under R2P requires Security 
Council authorisation.  
In particular, as one looks out on the ongoing humanitarian crisis within Syria one is 
left questioning whether R2P has had any meaningful impact in shaping the international 
community’s response towards the perpetration of mass atrocities. In many respects, when the 
international community began the dialogue around the question of the international 
community response to mass atrocity situations back in the year 2000, a description of the 
events in Syria over the course of the last five years would have been considered a perfect case 
study for R2P, particularly with respect to it shaping the response of the international 
community and its responsibility to intervene through the UN Security Council. However, 
when one looks closely at the role played by R2P in the Security Council’s response to Syria 
it would seem that R2P has had, at most, a limited role.4  
The purpose of this article is to examine whether, after 16 years or more of its 
development, R2P has emerged as an international norm of intervention. As an idea, it is clear 
that R2P has a considerable degree of prominence within international discourse. As will be 
discussed, there has been much work undertaken in the development of its language and 
conceptual framework over the years. However, whilst this architecture is important to the 
process of its development as an international norm, it will be argued herein that more is needed 
to support the claim that R2P has fully emerged as an international norm, i.e. R2P’s capacity 
to influence and shape the decision-making of states. Employing Finnemore and Sikkink’s 
analytical framework for the ‘norm life-cycle’,5 this article argues that there are three phases 
of R2P’s norm emergence that must be analysed to reach a full understanding of R2P’s impact 
as an international norm – first, the emergence of the norm, secondly its embeddedness at 
international level and, third, the internalisation of the norm by key states. It is contended that 
it is the degree to which the norm is internalised and impacts upon states’ decision-making that 
properly determines whether R2P has emerged as an international norm. Undertaking this 
analysis is a complex and largely imprecise exercise because, as Morris notes, ‘internalisation 
                                                            
3 See for example the UK claim to the existence of a right of humanitarian intervention within international law 
in ‘Human Rights’, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2000; Bellamy, ‘Responsibility to 
Protect or Trojan Horse? (n 1) 33. 
4 Of course, Syria is a hard case: it is a situation of considerable and increasing complexity. Syria is not the 
principal focus of this article, although certainly forms a telling backdrop to it. For a comprehensive overview of 
the complexity of the situation in Syria, see the informative Chatham House, ‘War in Syria’, 
www.chathamhouse.org/research/regions/middle-east-and-north-africa/war-in-syria. See also Breau (n 1) 255.  
5 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’ (1998) 52(4) 
International Organisation 887. 
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… [is] variable and hard to measure; and consequently, it is rarely possible to be certain how 
strong a justification for action of a particular norm will provide.’6 That said, to help assess the 
degree of internalisation of R2P by states one will look to the examine the role R2P has played 
in the decision-making of key member states, through examining the responses and actions of 
the Security Council with respect to the situations in Libya, the Côte d’Ivoire and Syria. This 
is because, as Finnemore and Sikkink note, ‘norms by definition embody a quality of 
“oughtness” and shared moral assessment’, thereby ‘norms prompt justifications for action and 
leave an extensive trail of communication among actors’.7 This part of the evaluation will 
therefore involve analysis of official records of Security Council resolutions and their 
corresponding meetings to assess the degree of influence exerted by R2P in state’s deliberations 
about how to respond to these situations.   
Following this introduction, this article consists of four sections. The next section will 
examine the dynamics of norm emergence as are applied in this article. Section III will provide 
an outline of the emergence of the concept of R2P. Section IV considers the extent to which 
R2P can be considered to be embedded at the international level. Section V will then examine 
the extent to which R2P has been internalised in the decision-making of key states within the 
international system; namely the member states of the UN Security Council and, in particular, 
the five permanent members. In the conclusion, it will be argued that whilst R2P may have 
strong ideational value at the international level with considerable embeddness, as a ‘norm’ of 
intervention, however, it remains highly contestable even after 16 years of its development. 
 
II. R2P: norm dynamics  
 
The definition of the term ‘norm’ as used in this article is a ‘standard of appropriate behaviour 
for actors with a given identity’,8 with the ‘identity’ of the actors in this case being states in the 
international community. Because norms involve ‘standards of appropriate behaviour’, they 
embody a quality of ‘oughtness’ representing a ‘shared moral assessment’.9 R2P would 
certainly fall into this characterisation as the development of the doctrine is clearly intended to 
shape states’ choices with respect to the idea of responsibility of states to the idea of human 
                                                            
6 Morris (n 1) 1267. 
7 Finnemore and Sikkink (n 5) 892. 
8 Ibid, 891; Cf, Andrew P Cortell and James W Davis, Jr, ‘How Do International Institutions Matter? The Domestic 
Impact of International Rules and Norms’ (1996) 40(4) International Studies Quarterly 451, 452 (‘Norms 
represent “standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations”’’). 
9 Finnemore and Sikkink (n 5) 892. 
The Version of Record of this manuscript has been published and is available in the Journal on the 
Use of Force and International Law, Spring/Summer 2018, http://www.tandfonline.com/, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/20531702.2018.1448156  
 
5 
 
security and the protection of citizens. An implicit, yet key, feature of a norm, however, is its 
capacity to influence behavioural change by actors. Taking this as our starting point the key 
question becomes: how do we identify R2P as a norm? Finnemore and Sikkink point out that 
‘[w]e can only have indirect evidence of norms just as we can only have indirect evidence of 
most other motivations for political action (interests or threats, for example).’10 One approach 
that can be taken is to examine the extent to which R2P shapes state behaviour through its 
decision-making by assessing the degree to which the norm constitutes a ‘justification for 
action’.11 This involves consideration of where R2P has been used as an explanation for 
member states of the Security Council’s decision-making and reason for action. 
Applying Finnemore and Sikkink’s model of the ‘norm life-cycle’, in order to identify 
R2P as a norm would require three phases of the ‘norm life-cycle’ to be completed – first, the 
emergence of the norm, secondly its embeddedness at international level and, third, the 
internalisation of the norm by key states.12 According to Finnemore and Sikkink the first phase 
consists of persuasion by norm entrepreneurs that attempt to convince a critical mass of states, 
known as ‘norm leaders’, to embrace the norm. The second phase is characterised as a process 
of ‘imitation’, whereby ‘norm leaders’ attempt to convince other states within the international 
system to become norm followers. Once enough states have become convinced, this leads to 
what is described as a ‘norm cascade’ throughout the system as the norm becomes more and 
more accepted as ‘standard of appropriate behaviour’. In the third phase internalisation of the 
norm occurs, whereby states identify with its normative prescription regarding their conduct. 
Through this process the norm becomes influential in state decision-making and shaping state 
behaviour. At the far end of this third phase the norm acquires a ‘taken- for-granted quality’.13 
The first thing to note is that it is not uncommon for a state to appear to endorse a norm 
and yet take no action internally with respect to that norm. For example, states may provide 
fulsome rhetorical support and acclamation for the emergence and development of a norm 
through the auspices of the UN. This could involve support for General Assembly resolutions 
embodying the norm. Where the norm is developed through a series of interactions at the 
international level this can, in time, lead to the norm becoming embedded in the international 
system through a process of ‘norm cascade.’14 ‘Norm cascade’ represents the ‘broad norm 
                                                            
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid, 895. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
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acceptance’ which leads to the norm becoming the ‘prevailing standard of appropriateness’.15 
But without a sufficient level of internalisation, the norm remains an aspirational statement, 
rather than a prescriptive formula of how a state must act (or refrain from acting). Therefore, 
the greater the ‘norm cascade’ and internalization of the norm among states, the greater the 
influence the norm will have upon state behaviour.   
Finnemore and Sikkink’s conceptualisation of the dynamic of norm emergence and 
establishment is not too far removed from the way in which an international lawyer would 
understand the formation and establishment of customary international law. It would seem, 
simply put, that the concepts of cascade and internalisation operate similarly to the customary 
international law requirements of state practice and opinio juris. The idea of norm cascade 
throughout the international community reflects a similar requirement of state practice. Where 
a cascading norm achieves a sufficient degree of internalisation ‘norms acquire a taken-for-
granted quality’.16 In the same way, with the formation of customary international law, in order 
for state practice to become law there must be a belief by states that the state practice constitutes 
law – put in norm dynamic terms, the state practice has a taken for granted quality as law. This 
is because in respect of both the emergence of a norm and customary international law a state 
can appear to endorse a norm (state practice) and yet take no action internally with respect to 
that norm (opinio juris). Without a sufficient level of internalisation (opinio juris) the norm 
(state practice) remains an aspirational statement, rather than a prescriptive formula of how a 
state must act/not act. 
It should be noted that the impact of a norm in influencing the decision-making of states 
depends upon the extent to which that norm is embedded within what is often a highly contested 
normative space.17 Finnemore and Sikkink point out that where new norms emerge they ‘never 
enter a normative vacuum’ but instead tend to emerge in a ‘highly contested narrative space 
where they must compete with other norms and perceptions of interest.’18  These existing norms 
                                                            
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Morris (n 1) 1267. 
18 Finnemore and Sikkink (n 5) 897. Due to the politics of the Security Council and, in particular, the five 
permanent members, it is true to say that the possibility of humanitarian intervention being authorised has been 
severely limited. Broadly characterised, polarisation exists within the permanent members between observing the 
classic Grotian values of state sovereignty and non-intervention (Russia and China), and the more progressive 
protection of human rights and humanitarian values (US, UK and France). In particular, Russia and China (along 
with other non-Western states) have carried the concern that the intervention aspect of R2P might be used by the 
powerful Western states to disguise the pursuit of other strategic objectives. The political machinations of the 
Security Council are clearly a central feature of most analysis of the effectiveness of R2P because the Council 
retains control over its operation. See Garwood-Gowers (n 1) 94. 
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will most often be firmly embedded within the existing system. In the case of R2P, for example, 
it has continuously been counterpoised against the key international norm of state sovereignty 
in the development of its normative content,19 in addition to the existing UN Charter paradigm 
for any intervention.  
In sum, evaluating R2P as a norm is achieved not from measuring the degree of 
international acclaim that it has received, but requires assessing the degree to which the norm 
is internalized by states and thereby leads to behavioural change by states.20 Moreover, 
Finnemore and Sikkink argue that the placing of a norm within an international organisation 
as a set of rules or principles is simply part of the dynamic of norm cascade. It is not an 
indication of a widely or deeply internalised norm.21  What is needed is both sufficient numbers 
of states, and deep internalization by ‘key’ states. Finnemore and Sikkink stress that some states 
are ‘critical to a norm’s adoption’ and thereby its effectiveness.22 What constitutes a ‘key’ state 
‘will vary from issue to issue, but one criterion is that critical states are those without which 
the achievement of the substantive norm goal is compromised.’23  Here, then, the UN Security 
Council permanent members are key states in this context. Taking into account the central role 
of the Security Council in the operation of R2P, particularly with respect to the responsibility 
to intervene under Pillar 3, without the adoption of these states the effectiveness of R2P is 
seriously compromised. Therefore, according to Finnemore and Sikkink, securing the support 
of the permanent members of the Security Council would be critical to achieve the necessary 
norm cascade.24  
 
III. Norm emergence: The rise of R2P 
 
Following the intervention of NATO in Kosovo in 1999, the then UN Secretary General Kofi 
Annan posed the following question: ‘if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable 
assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and 
                                                            
19 See generally, International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect 
(International Development Research Centre, 2001); Stahn (n 1) 99; Garwood-Gowers (n 1) 94. 
20 See generally, Thomas Risse, Stephen C Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds), The Persistent Power of Human 
Rights: From Commitment to Compliance (Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
21 Finnemore and Sikkink (n 5) 895. 
22 Ibid, 901. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
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systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?’25 
It was in trying to answer Kofi Annan’s question that the Canadian government established the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). The Commission 
consisted of a panel of international experts intended ‘to reflect a range of geographical, 
political and professional backgrounds’.26 From the Commission the responsibility to protect 
doctrine had its genesis in December 2001 with the publication of its final report entitled 
‘Responsibility to Protect’.27   
The R2P doctrine has been an evolving concept since its first presentation to the 
international community by ICISS.28 Underlying the ICISS report was a desire to reformulate 
the discussion about the conceptualisation of the responsibility of states to respond to mass 
atrocities.29 There were a number of ways in which it sought to do this. To begin with, ICISS 
attempted to re-focus the view of where responsibility for protection lies, by placing it 
principally with each state in relation to its own citizens. It is only where there is failing on the 
part of the state that the international community is then called upon to intervene.30 As far as 
ICISS was concerned this intervention need not necessarily be military but was not limited to 
non-military intervention either.31 ICISS formulated three strands to its concept of 
responsibility: the responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react and the responsibility to 
rebuild.32 
The ‘responsibility to prevent’ is the notion that states have a responsibility to ensure 
that domestic tensions are addressed before they escalate.33 Where a state fails in this 
responsibility this then passes to the international community. The ‘responsibility to rebuild’ 
                                                            
25 Kofi A Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations, ‘We the Peoples’: The Role of the United Nations in 
the 21st Century (United Nations, 2000) 48. Then British Prime Minister Tony Blair went further and promised 
that ‘if Rwanda happens again we would not walk away as the outside has done many times before’. See Tony 
Blair, speech given at Labour Party Conference, Brighton, UK (2 October 2001), quoted in Bellamy, 
‘Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse?’ (n 1). 
26 Adele Brown, ‘Reinventing Humanitarian Intervention: Two Cheers for the Responsibility to Protect?’ 
Research Paper 08/55 (17 June 2008) International Affairs and Defence Section, House of Commons Library, 
http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/RP08-55#fullreport (accessed 15 November 
2016). The participants in the Commission were led by Co-Chairs Gareth Evans, former Foreign Affairs Minister 
of Australia, and Mohamed Sahnoun of Algeria, Special Advisor to the UN Secretary-General. The ten other 
ICISS Commissioners were Gisèle Côté-Harper, Lee Hamilton, Michael Ignatieff, Vladimir Lukin, Klaus 
Naumann, Cyril Ramaphosa, Fidel Ramos, Cornelio Sommaruga, Eduardo Stein and Ramesh Thakur. 
27 ICISS (n 19). 
28 For an outline of the evolutionary process that R2P has undergone, see Hehir (n 1) 122–32; Bellamy, Global 
Politics and the Responsibility to Protect (n 1) 1–51. 
29 Hehir (n 1) 123. 
30 ICISS (n 19) 16. 
31 Ibid, 8. 
32 Ibid, 17; Garwood-Gowers (n 1) 93; Hehir (n 1) 123. 
33 Ibid, 124; ICISS (n 19) 19–27. 
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places a responsibility on an intervening state, or states, to contribute to the process of post-
conflict recovery.34 Of the three strands it is the ‘responsibility to react’ that has caused the 
most controversy and is the focus here. Its importance within the R2P concept was emphasised 
in the ICISS report, where it was stated that ‘above all else’ R2P establishes for the international 
community ‘a responsibility to react to situations of compelling need for human protection’.35 
According to ICISS, if a state is unwilling or unable to meet its responsibility to protect its 
citizens then the responsibility moves from the state to the international community.36 Not in 
every situation will military intervention be a legitimate response; ICISS envisaged that 
military intervention would be confined to the most exceptional situations.  It thus outlined six 
‘Principles for Military Intervention’: right authority, just cause, right intention, last resort, 
proportional means and reasonable prospects.37  
The doctrine outlined in the ICISS report was subject to detailed evaluation and 
reinterpretation by the international community. In 2004, the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change, having considered the ICISS report, published its report in which it 
agreed that the international community had a responsibility to protect populations when their 
government failed to do so, but reaffirmed the central role of the UN Security Council in 
enforcing this responsibility. The final report of the Secretary-General’s High Level Panel 
endorsed R2P at the 2005 World Summit.38 
Underlying the World Summit’s decision to adopt the ‘responsibility to protect’ was 
the idea that the international community has a moral duty to ensure atrocities such as those 
perpetrated in Cambodia, Rwanda, Srebrenica in the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
and Kosovo were to be prevented or halted. Under R2P it was to be the moral duty of the 
international community to assist all states to meet their responsibility to protect (that is, the 
responsibility of a state to protect its population from the four core crimes of genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity).39 Where a state manifestly fails to meet 
this responsibility to its population, the international community is to take timely and decisive 
action, including, most controversially, the resort to forceful intervention.40 
                                                            
34 Ibid, 39–45. 
35 Ibid, 29. 
36 Hehir (n 1) 124. 
37 ICISS (n 19) 32; Hehir (n 1) 124. 
38 2005 World Summit Outcome, UNGA Res 60/1, UN Doc A/RES/60/1 (24 October 2005). The key paragraphs 
are 138 and 139.  
39 Bellamy, ‘Added Value or Hot Air?’ (n 1) 333. 
40 Ibid. 
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The responsibility to protect is threefold, which, in its current formulation, is 
characterised as a three-pillar structure.41 Pillar 1 states that the primary responsibility is that 
of the state to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity, and from their incitement; Pillar 2 states that the international community 
has a responsibility to assist and encourage states to fulfil their responsibility to protect, 
particularly by helping them to address the underlying causes of genocide and mass atrocities, 
build the capacity to prevent these crimes, and address problems before they escalate.42 The 
principal emphasis of R2P, therefore, is one of prevention through early monitoring and 
assistance.43 However, where prevention does not succeed, Pillar 3 of R2P provides that the 
international community has a responsibility to take timely and decisive action to protect 
populations from the four crimes through diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means 
(principally in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the UN Charter).  Should peaceful 
means prove inadequate and where national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their 
populations, other more forceful means through Chapter VII of the UN Charter, i.e. military 
intervention, may be adopted.  
An interesting feature of the development of the three-pillar structure is the assertion 
by the Secretary General and some states that the operationalisation of R2P is not to be seen as 
an either/or approach to the implementation of the three pillars.44 A clearly expressed feature 
of R2P’s three-pillar structure is that each pillar is of equal value and it is not necessarily the 
case that the parameters of each pillar must be exhausted before moving on to the next pillar, 
in particular with the operation of pillars 2 and 3 and the use of forcible intervention. While 
forcible intervention may be a ‘last resort’, its use does not require ‘a prior futile use of other 
means’ – such as those under Pillar 2.45 R2P thereby has an inherently complex structure. It 
therefore seems important at this stage to delimit the scope of the rest of this analysis. Here 
R2P, under its three-pillar structure, is viewed as more than just one norm. Arguably, it is an 
agglomeration of norms for humanitarian protection, some aspects of which have greater 
                                                            
41 See UN Doc A/RES/60/1 (n 38) paras 138–9. See also Hehir (n 1) 130. 
42 See Ban Ki-moon, ‘Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations: Implementing the Responsibility to 
Protect’, UN Doc A/63/677 (12 January 2009) 8.  
43 See Hehir (n 1) 130 (describing the response in the General Assembly to the Outcome Document 2005: ‘It was 
consistently stressed [by states] that prevention was a key component of R2P; many states emphasised that R2P 
involved much more than military intervention and, further, that its greatest potential efficacy lay in its capacity 
to prevent, rather than halt, humanitarian crisis’). See also ibid, 132–4 (providing critical analysis of the emphasis 
on prevention within the R2P doctrine).  
44 See, e.g. General Assembly: Statement by Ambassador Berger at the 4th Informal Interactive Dialogue on the 
Responsibility to Protect (5 September, 2012). 
45 Ibid. 
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normative resolution than others.46 This view would seem to be borne out by the UN Secretary 
General’s own treatment of the doctrine through his series of special reports on R2P, which 
focussed upon each of the aspects of the three-pillar structure separately, whilst within each 
report ensuring that the treatment of each of the pillars addressed were analysed not only as a 
particular normative goal but also within the broader normative construct of R2P.47 Seeing R2P 
in this way enables one then to consider the different tenets of R2P for which, arguably, there 
are different norm dynamics at play.  The most controversial aspect,48 and the subject of 
analysis here, is R2P’s humanitarian intervention norm encompassing the role and 
responsibility of the international community to react and use military intervention where the 
humanitarian situation demands such, due to a state’s perpetration of, or inability to prevent 
the perpetration of, the four core crimes against its population.  
 
IV. Evaluating R2P’s embeddedness  
 
That R2P has emerged as an international norm is still somewhat contested in both international 
law and international relations literature.49 On the one hand, it is asserted by Risse and Roppe 
that ‘a new international norm has emerged, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), referring to 
the responsibility of the international community to intervene – by military means is necessary 
– if state rulers are unwilling or incapable of protecting their citizens from gross human rights 
violations.’50 On the other hand, Stahn has previously argued that R2P ‘remains uncertain from 
a normative point of view … Responsibility to protect is thus in many ways still a political 
catchword rather than a legal norm.’51 The question of R2Ps acceptance as a norm is probably 
best encapsulated by the Aidan Herir’s questioning of R2P as constituting a ‘norm or 
nebulous?’52 According to Herir a key factor militating against it constituting a norm is that the 
conceptual framework for R2P is underdeveloped and indeterminate, particularly in respect of 
the matter of intervention.53 That said, since 2005 there has been much work done by the UN 
to try to provide greater conceptual clarity with the regular provision of detailed reports by the 
                                                            
46 Kantareva (n 1) 1. 
47 See n 54 for the range of reports published by the Secretary General providing greater conceptual clarity. 
48 Garwood-Gowers (n 1) 93. 
49 Hehir (n 1) 137. 
50 Risse, Ropp and Sikkink (n 20) 3. See also Hehir (n 1) 137. 
51 Stahn (n 1) 120. See also Garwood-Gowers (n 1) 95. 
52 Garwood-Gowers (n 1) 96; Hehir (n 1) 120. 
53 Ibid, 138. 
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Secretary-General addressing the respective pillars and norms that make up R2P. In particular, 
since 2009 the Secretary-General has published annual reports focussed upon the matter of 
implementation and operationalisation of R2P.54   
In addition to the conceptual refinement of R2P there has also been considerable 
rhetorical support for R2P at the international level amongst states. Since 2005, states have 
provided much fulsome support for the doctrine within the UN and other international fora.55 
An indicative example is the UK, which has been effusive in its support for the development 
of R2P at various stages within the UN. This is both with respect to R2P more broadly (i.e. the 
doctrine encompassing all three pillars) and with respect to the responsibility to intervene under 
Pillar 3, more specifically. The UK thus is a prime example of what Finnemore and Sikkink 
would describe as a ‘norm entrepreneur’.56 By way of illustration, the UK engaged centrally 
with the development of R2P through the ICISS.57 It has also been vocal in its commitment to 
R2P within the UN since the agreement of the World Outcome Document 2005.58 This was 
                                                            
54 UN Doc A/63/677 (n 42) 8; ‘Report of the Secretary-General: Early Warning, Assessment and the 
Responsibility to Protect’, UN Doc A/64/864 (14 July 2010); ‘Report of the Secretary General: The Role of 
Regional and Sub-Regional Arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’, UN Doc A/65/877-
S/2011/393 (27 June 2011); ‘Report of the Secretary General: Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive 
Response’, UN Doc A/66/874-S/2012/578 (25 July 2012); ‘Report of the Secretary General: Responsibility to 
Protect: State Responsibility and Prevention’, UN Doc A/67/929-S/2013/399 (13 July 2013); ‘Report of the 
Secretary General: Fulfilling our Collective Responsibility: International Assistance and the Responsibility to 
Protect’, UN Doc A/68/947-S/2014/449 (11 July 2014); ‘Report of the Secretary General: A Vital and Enduring 
Commitment: Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’, UN Doc A/69/981-S/2015/500 (13 July 2015). 
55 For a detailed list of government statements referring to R2P, see the International Coalition for the 
Responsibility to Protect website, www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/about-rtop/government-statements-
on-rtop (accessed 10 November 2016).  
56 Finnemore and Sikkink (n 5) 896. 
57 It is worth highlighting that prior to the development of the doctrine of R2P the UK had been one of the few 
states within the international system to argue the existence of a right of humanitarian intervention within 
international law. During the NATO intervention in Kosovo, the UK was one of the few NATO states to articulate 
a legal basis for the right of humanitarian intervention without express Security Council authorisation. See 
‘Human Rights’, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2000 – The framework for humanitarian 
intervention was built on six principles: 
1. An intervention is an admission of failure of prevention. We need a strengthened culture of conflict 
prevention. 
2. We should maintain the principle that armed force should only be used as a last resort. 
3. The immediate responsibility for halting violence rests with the state in which it occurs. 
4. When faced with an overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe, which a government has shown it is 
unwilling or unable to prevent or is actively promoting, the international community should 
intervene. Intervention in internal affairs is a sensitive issue, so there must be convincing evidence 
of extreme humanitarian distress on a large scale, requiring urgent relief. It must be objectively clear 
that there is no practicable alternative to the use of force to save lives. 
5. Any use of force should be proportionate to achieving the humanitarian purpose and carried out in 
accordance with international law. The military action must be likely to achieve its objectives. 
6. Any use of force should be collective. No individual country can reserve to itself the right to act on 
behalf of the international community. 
58 For a helpful source of UK government statements on R2P within the United Nations, see ‘United Kingdom’s 
Statements on RtoP from 2005-Present’, International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (ICRtoP), 
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reaffirmed by Lord Malloch-Brown, the UK Ambassador to the UN, speaking at the General 
Assembly on 23 July 2009, who described R2P as a ‘groundbreaking’ achievement, of which 
the UN ‘should be rightly proud’.59 He went on to say that ‘the Responsibility to protect activity 
encompasses a wide range of possible actions designed to help States protect their populations 
– all, as the Secretary-General makes clear, in accordance with the UN Charter. Collective 
action should be determined by an assessment of the situation on the ground and of the best 
tools suited to address that.’60 More recently the UK government’s commitment to R2P was 
reaffirmed by a statement made at the UN General Assembly Interactive Dialogue on 
Responsibility to Protect on 11 September 2013: ‘Since… the Responsibility to Protect has 
emerged as an important global principle. We in the UK are fully committed to implementing 
the Responsibility to Protect.’61 Within the UN, since 2005 the UK has made some 25 
statements supporting or affirming R2P.62  
Advocates of R2P would point beyond these rhetorical affirmations of the idea, 
however, and argue that testament to R2P’s influence is exemplified in its central role in the 
international community’s response to the crises in Libya and the Côte d’Ivoire in 2010–
2011.63 Its advocates argue that at the heart of the UN’s response to each crises was R2P’s 
normative imperative.64 With respect to Libya it is seen as pertinent that in Resolution 1970 
(2011) and Resolution 1973 (2011) the Security Council made explicit reference to R2P.65 In 
relation to the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (responding to election violence in the country) 
it is also argued that R2P played a central role in Resolution 1975 adopted by the Security 
Council.66 According to Alex Bellamy, for example, 
 
[t]hese three resolutions, passed without a single negative vote, clearly demonstrated 
the Council’s determination to act on its responsibility to protect populations, including 
                                                            
www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/component/content/article/134-americas/5439--united-kingdoms-
statements-on-rtop-from-2005-present (accessed 16 September 2016). 
59 UNGA Verbatim Record, UN Doc A/63/PV.97 (23 July 2009) 6. 
60 Ibid, 7. 
61 Statement by Ambassador Wilson, of the UK Mission to the UN, at the UN General Assembly Interactive 
Dialogue on Responsibility to Protect, www.gov.uk/government/speeches/uk-fully-committed-to-implementing-
the-responsibility-to-protect (accessed 16 September 2016). 
62 See n 55. 
63 Aidan  Hehir, ‘The Permanence of Inconsistency: Libya, The Security Council and the Responsibility to Protect’ 
(2013) 38 International Security 137; Alex J Bellamy and Paul D Williams, ‘The New Politics of Protection? 
Côte d’Ivoire, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect’ (2011) 87 International Affairs 825. 
64 Bellamy, Towards a ‘Living Reality’ (n 1) 16. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
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through the use of force when necessary and possible. They signalled a new phase in 
the Council’s history from which there could be no return.67  
 
Such an optimistic view of R2P’s influence as a norm is not uncontested, however.  
 
V. Evaluating the internalisation of R2P 
 
At the outset of this article it was posited that there are three phases of R2P’s norm emergence 
that must be analysed to reach a full understanding of R2P’s impact as a humanitarian 
intervention norm. Up to this point the analysis herein has focussed upon the phase one and 
two of R2P’s ‘norm life-cycle’: the emergence of the norm and its embeddedness at the 
international level. Through its emergence as an idea from ICISS and to its subsequent doctrinal 
development, coupled with its support and acclamation through various UN Secretary General 
Reports and General Assembly resolutions, R2P could reasonably be argued to have emerged 
and become embedded as an important doctrine in international discourse. However, in order 
to be considered a fully emerged international norm the emergence of R2P and its 
embeddedness in the international system, i.e. R2P’s ‘norm cascade’, must lead to its deep 
internalisation by states. The third phase to be examined, then, is the extent of internalisation 
of R2P by states. This section will consider whether the answer to the limited extent of the role 
played by R2P in the conditioning key states’ policy choices and decision-making within the 
Security Council actions involving intervention may in part be due to the limited extent of its 
internalisation by states in this sense. 
When one considers the Security Council resolutions in detail and the role of R2P 
within them, one is struck by the limited extent to which R2P forms a basis for Security Council 
action. In the main the only aspect of R2P that is referred to is the responsibility of the state in 
question to fulfil its responsibility to protect its own population. According to Morris, 
commenting on Libya,   
 
the official record of UNSC’s deliberations over Resolution 1973 gives little support to 
assertions that R2P was a major influencing factor on decisions over the most 
                                                            
67 Ibid, 19. Bellamy also points to UNSC Res 1996, UN Doc S/RES/1996 (8 July 2011) (which established a UN 
peace operation for South Sudan); UNSC Res 2014, UN Doc S/RES/2014 (21 October 2011) (addressing the 
situation in Yemen); and UNSC Res 2085, UN Doc S/RES/2085 (20 December 2012) (on Mali as being based 
upon R2P and further support for R2P’s influence as a norm). 
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appropriate form of intervention. Throughout the Council’s deliberations only France 
and Colombia referred to the concept, and even then only in respect of Libya’s 
responsibility to protect its citizens.68 
 
Certainly in respect of Libya and, then, subsequently in respect of Côte d’Ivoire and Syria, no 
reference is made in the resolutions to the international community’s responsibility to protect.69 
For example, with respect to Libya and Security Council Resolution 1970 (2011), the reference 
to R2P merely consisted of the Security Council, ‘[r]ecalling the Libyan authorities’ 
responsibility to protect its population’.70 In the now infamous resolution authorising NATO 
intervention, Council Resolution 1973 (2011), the extent of the resolution’s reference to R2P 
was: ‘Reiterating the responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan population 
and reaffirming that parties to armed conflicts bear the primary responsibility to take all 
feasible steps to ensure the protection of civilians’.71  
If one looks at the public records of Council meetings on Libya it is notable that there 
is a pattern of referring overwhelmingly to the primary responsibility of the state to protect its 
citizens with very limited reference to the responsibility of the international community to 
protect.72 Morris suggests that this pattern of selective invocation of R2P’s tenets is 
 
all the more notable given the Secretary General’s explicit citation before the Council 
of the responsibilities to protect which attach to both national governments and the 
                                                            
68 Morris (n 1) 1272. 
69 Ibid (‘This practice of referring only to R2P’s pillar one elements was mirrored in the textual composition of 
the Council’s resolutions on Libya, with Resolutions 1970, 1973, 2016 and 2040 all referring to the responsibility 
of the state, but making no mention of the broader responsibility said to fall on the wider international community 
when states fail to meet their pillar on responsibilities’). 
70 UNSC Res 1973, UN Doc S/RES/1973 (17 March 2011). See ‘Swift, Decisive Action, Security Council 
Imposes Tough Measures on Libyan Regime, Adopting Resolution 1970 in Wake of Crackdown on Protesters’, 
Security Council meetings coverage, 6491st mtg, UN Doc SC/10187/REV.1 (26 February 2011) 
www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10187.doc.htm (reporting, regarding the Security Council vote on Resolution 1973 
(2011), that ‘[i]n their explanations of vote, Council members welcomed the unanimity of the action and expressed 
solidarity with the people of Libya, hoping that their “swift and decisive” intervention would help bring them 
relief. Many expressed hope that the resolution was a strong step in affirming the responsibility of states to protect 
their people as well as the legitimate role of the Council to step in when they failed to meet that responsibility.’ 
However, in the reported statements of the 15-member Council only one member made reference to R2P: 
‘GÉRARD ARAUD (France) welcomed the fact that the Council had unanimously answered yesterday’s appeal 
by the Libyan representative. The referral of the matter to the International Criminal Court might ensure that those 
responsible for the crimes were brought to justice. The Court had once again showed the rationale for its existence. 
The resolution recalled the accountability of each state for the protection of its population and the role of the 
international community when that responsibility was not met. He hoped the vote would open a new era for the 
international community as a whole’). 
71 UN Doc S/RES/1973 (n 70). 
72 Morris (n 1) 1272. 
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international community. Having been clearly reminded of their obligations, the 
majority of UNSC member states chose not to draw on such language in justifying their 
approaches to the crisis in Libya.73 
 
Consequently, when one undertakes a textual analysis of Council resolutions on Libya as a 
whole it seems unclear that the basis for intervention was R2P. When one further combines 
this with the statements from meetings had by states surrounding the Libya situation it seems 
even less clear that the basis for intervention in Libya was R2P (as opposed to other 
humanitarian, strategic, political and security factors). 
Similarly, a limited role for R2P was also apparent in Security Council Resolution 1975 
(2011), addressing the situation in Côte d’Ivoire. Again, the most explicit reference to R2P is 
to the ‘primary responsibility of each State to protect civilians’.74 And notably in the operative 
paragraphs authorising intervention there is no further reference to R2P and certainly no 
reference to the responsibility of the international community. Instead the basis for action is 
the more formulaic language of collective security. Once again, the ‘textual composition’75 of 
the Council resolutions and deliberations does not support the optimistic claim of the centrality 
of the R2P in the considerations of states and the Security Council. However, Libya and Côte 
d’Ivoire both have been held up as defining moments for R2P – in particular with respect to 
Libya. In 2011 UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon gave the following optimistic appraisal of 
the impact of R2P: 
 
In 2011, history took a turn for the better. The responsibility to protect came of age; the 
principle was tested as never before. The results were uneven, but at the end of the day, 
tens of thousands of lives were saved. We gave hope to people long oppressed. In Libya, 
Côte d’Ivoire, South Sudan, Yemen and Syria, by our words and actions, we 
demonstrated that human protection is a defining purpose of the United Nations in the 
twenty-first century.76 
 
                                                            
73 Ibid. 
74 UNSC Res 1975, UN Doc S/RES/1975 (30 March 2011). 
75 Morris (n 1) 1272. 
76 Ban Ki-moon, United Nations Secretary General, address to the Stanley Foundation Conference on the 
Responsibility to Protect, New York (18 January 2012). 
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Nonetheless, the rush to attribute good cause to R2P has proved something of a double edged 
sword. As has been well documented, the eventual intervention in Libya subsequently proved 
to be controversial in both its scope and effect. Arguably the intervention in Libya left R2P 
somewhat tarnished as a doctrine of humanitarian intervention.77 There is an apparent irony to 
this because, as has been suggested in the foregoing, R2P played only a limited role in the 
relevant Security Council resolutions and deliberations of states. However, as Morris notes, the 
association of R2P with the more controversial aspects of the intervention in Libya cast a ‘dark 
shadow’78 over R2P and nowhere has this been more evident than with respect to the situation 
in Syria. 
The situation in Syria is very difficult as now the humanitarian crisis has taken on 
complex dimensions with the rise of ISIL and the threat of international terrorism, regional and 
international strategic manoeuvrings and the ever increasing humanitarian crisis. Multiple 
states have intervened, both regional and international actors. Since 2011, when the UN 
Secretary General was first briefed on the deteriorating situation in Syria,79 the response of the 
Security Council has been characterised by division and inaction, to the extent that the 
authorisation of a humanitarian intervention could not be agreed. Early attempts were made to 
secure non-coercive resolutions identifying the grave humanitarian situation but these were 
frustrated by Chinese and Russian vetoes.80 Undoubtedly there were other strategic, political 
and security factors at play that cloud any straightforward analysis of the Council’s response 
to Syria. That said, however, Morris suggests that when one examines the justifications for why 
Russia and China rejected attempts for Council authorisation of intervention, even of a non-
coercive kind, they reflect not just a rejection of the specific case of intervention in Syria but 
the rejection of the ‘wider normative agenda’.81  That is, R2P itself. 
When examining the invocation of R2P within Security Council resolutions on the 
situation in Syria, again, as with Libya and Côte d’Ivoire, it is striking how limited this is. 82 In 
                                                            
77 See Garwood-Gowers (n 1) 97 (noting that ‘[w]hile the passage of Resolution 1973 authorizing military force 
against the Gaddafi regime was initially seen as a triumph for R2P, under the surface there were deep divisions 
within the UNSC. NATO’s support for the Libyan rebels and the eventual removal of Gaddafi prompted renewed 
concerns among the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) and other non-Western states over the 
potential for R2P to be used as a pretext for regime change. This led to extensive “blow-back” against R2P, which 
was evident in the UNSC’s inability to agree on any effective civilian protection measures on Syria’). 
78 Morris (n 1) 1274. 
79 UNSC Verbatim Record, UN Doc S/PV.6524 (27 April 2011). 
80 UNSC Draft Res, UN Doc S/2011/612 (4 October 2011). 
81 Morris (n 1) 1276. 
82 Ibid (noting that only seven Council Members between 2011 and 2013 made explicit or clear reference to R2P 
(all citing the Pillar 1 obligation and not more): Colombia, France, Togo, Rwanda, Japan, and Brazil).  
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Council Resolution 2139 (2014), for example, the only reference to R2P is with respect to 
Syria’s primary responsibility to protect its citizens. In the subsequent Council Resolution 2165 
(2014), again there was limited reference to R2P, merely containing a statement ‘[r]eaffirming 
the primary responsibility of the Syrian authorities’.83 In the following draft resolution, vetoed 
by Russia and China (seeking to refer the situation in Syria to the Prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Court) there was no reference to R2P.84 Where R2P is referred to in the subsequent 
Resolutions 2254 and 2258 (2015), again, it is solely in respect to the primary responsibility of 
‘the Syrian authorities to protect the population in Syria’.85  
Thus, as with both the Libya and Côte d’Ivoire situations, the assertion of R2P in 
Council resolutions has also been limited with respect to Syria. Where R2P has been invoked, 
likewise with Libya and Côte d’Ivoire, its invocation has been with respect to asserting the 
primary responsibility of Syria to fulfil its ‘primary’ responsibility to protect its citizens. 
Notably, and of particular importance, is the fact that no Council resolution asserts the 
responsibility of the international community under Pillar 3 of R2P.   
Possibly more telling is that in Council meetings discussing situation in Syria, in which 
states have had the opportunity to express their underlying attitudes, policies, perspectives and 
preferences with respect the resolutions, there was equally very limited reference to R2P. These 
meetings can be the source of states speaking more freely and enabling states to express any 
dissent. However, with respect to all the resolutions noted, the opinions expressed by states 
were distinctly lacking reference to R2P, in the main.  
In similar vein to the Resolutions, in the opinions expressed by states in the associated 
meetings emphasis was placed upon the primary responsibility of Syria to protect its citizens. 
With respect to the Council meeting for Resolution 2139, for example, Argentina and Lithuania 
were the only states that made explicit reference to R2P and in both cases this was limited to 
asserting Syria’s primary responsibility to protect its citizens.86 Regarding the meeting for 
Council Resolution 2165 only Lithuania made reference R2P, asserting that the ‘primary 
responsibility lies with the Syrian government’ and more broadly to the ‘responsibility of the 
parties to the conflict’ to protect the citizens of Syria.87 In the meeting for Council Resolution 
2254, only Malaysia made reference to R2P, which again was limited in its scope, emphasising 
                                                            
83 UNSC Res 2165, UN Doc S/RES/2165 (14 July 2014). 
84 UNSC Draft Res, UN Doc S/2014/348 (22 May 2014). 
85 UNSC Res 2254, UN Doc S/RES/2254 (18 December 2015); UNSC Res 2258, UN Doc S/RES/2258 (22 
December 2015). 
86 UNSC Verbatim Record, UN Doc S/PV.7116 (22 February 2014). 
87 UNSC Verbatim Record, UN Doc S/PV.7216 (14 July 2014). 
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the Syrian government’s ‘primary responsibility and obligation to protect its own people.’88 
Whereas in the meeting for Resolution 2258 there was no reference made to R2P at all.89 Only 
in one case was reference made to the Council having a responsibility to protect. That was by 
Australia in regard to the previously mentioned failed draft resolution seeking to refer the Syria 
situation to the ICC which was vetoed by Russia and China.90 
From the foregoing it seems clear that R2P has had a limited role within the 
deliberations of the Security Council with respect to the situation in Syria. This is highlighted 
in the limited number of times that R2P has been cited by the Council or by states and has been 
confined to references to the primary responsibility of Syria to protect its own citizens. 
Moreover, what is absent in the resolutions and Council meetings is the invocation of the 
responsibility to protect of the international community under Pillar 3. States that were once 
forceful in their assertion of the responsibility to protect with respect to Libya have been 
notably less so with respect to Syria.91 Whilst this textual analysis of Council resolutions and 
meetings cannot be considered definitive for arriving at a conclusion as to whether R2P has the 
degree of influence attributed to it by its advocates, it certainly helps to build a picture. That 
picture indicates that whilst the idea of responsibility to protect has some place in the 
consciousness of states, it is apparently mostly limited to Pillar 1 and arguably has little impact 
with respect to Pillar 3. The picture drawn by Council resolutions and meetings is certainly 
indicative of a dissonance between states’ acclamation of the idea in its concept and the role 
R2P plays in their decision-making. Taking the situation in Syria, for example: whilst there 
was significant clamour for humanitarian intervention within international society more 
broadly, the response of the Security Council to this has been inadequate.  
  
VI. Conclusion 
 
The aim of this article was to examine the extent to which R2P, a much-lauded concept of 
humanitarian protection, has played a role in shaping the decision-making of states. It is 
through identifying this role that one is then able to determine the extent of R2P’s 
                                                            
88 UNSC Verbatim Record, UN Doc S/PV.7588 (18 December 2015). 
89 UNSC Verbatim Record, UN Doc S/PV.7595 (22 December 2015). 
90 UNSC Verbatim Record, UN Doc S/PV.7180 (22 May 2014). 
91 Morris (n 1) 1276 (noting, for example, ‘Colombia, a relatively vociferous advocate of R2P over Libya, became 
markedly more circumspect in its citation of R2P as the debates over Syria continued’). 
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transformation from a concept of ideational value to the quality of a norm with the power to 
influence state behaviour.  
That R2P has significant ideational value attributed to it is clear but the question of its 
impact as a norm is less so. R2P has gone through numerous iterations and conceptual 
developments; there is little questioning of its content. Much energy and time has been devoted 
by states and advocates to this task. Yet when one examines the role that R2P has played within 
the decision-making surrounding the situations discussed herein – Libya, Côte d’Ivoire and 
Syria – R2P has apparently had little influence in states’ discourse at the international level, 
with it apparently having very limited ‘enabling and constraining’ effect upon state behaviour. 
As has been shown, in Security Council resolutions and meetings, states have made only 
limited reference to the R2P and, in particular, no reference to the international community’s 
responsibility to protect under the third pillar of the concept.   
According to Morris there are two plausible explanations for the limited invocation of 
R2P by states. The first is that it is ‘conceivable that while R2P provided the conceptual 
framework through which some states framed their policy options, and that for some of them 
it even served as a motivating factor, it was nevertheless deemed inexpedient to cite the 
concept, especially in pillar three guise, given the controversy surrounding it.’92 The corollary 
of this is that R2P remains controversial and highly contested, especially with respect to its 
third pillar. This may indicate that R2P has not attained the level of norm cascade that is often 
presumed in the writings of many of its proponents.93 The second explanation is that in respect 
of each situation discussed, ‘states did not cite R2P… because it did not figure significantly in 
their thinking’,94 signalling a lack of internalisation.  
That R2P has strong value as a doctrine of human security and protection is not 
contested here. However, whilst R2P has undergone considerable development as a concept of 
human security and protection it seemingly has only had limited effect on the behaviour of key 
states as represented through their discourse surrounding the action, or lack of action, of the 
Security Council. This therefore undermines the claim to R2P as a fully formed international 
norm beyond its conceptual architecture. In order for R2P to be considered a norm that truly 
has emerged, not only must it have the conceptual framework and ideational support and 
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acclamation it has, it must also influence the behaviour of states in their decision-making, 
which apparently it has not.  
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